Formal vitae
Informal BIO follows:

Ed Clarke

Ed Clarke is currently a Senior Economist with the Office of

Management and Budget, (Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs)

involved in transportation regulatory affairs. He is a graduate of

Princeton University and the University of Chicago, where he received a

MBA and a PhD (1978). He has worked in public policy at the city/regional

(Chicago), State, Federal and international levels. Ed has been a Federal

government economist for 27 years.

As relates to his expertise in transportation economics and policy, he

served as a urban economic analyst with the Real Estate Research Corportation

of Chicago and the State of Illinois Bureau of the Budget (as economic advisor to the

Director). In both of these jobs he was involved in various aspects of

transportation finance and planning. He has served as special assistant

to the Secretary of the Treasury (George P. Shultz)and chief economist at A. I. D's Bureau

of Planning and Policy Coordination. During the mid-1970's, he was

heavily involved in airline and trucking deregulation and most recently in

oversight of Federal regulatory activities affecting transportation.

Optional: In public economics, he developed the demand revealing mechanism

for public project selection which was noted in the Nobel Committee's

award of the 1996 Nobel Prize in Economics to William Vickrey. Clarke's

1995 TRB paper (with Brough and Tideman) , entitled "Airport Congestion

and Noise, Interplay of Allocation and Distribution" illustrates the

potential applicability of the Vickrey and Clarke/Groves demand revealing

mechanisms to problems of transportation congestion.

Supplementary:

Borrowed/updated from an application to a Training Program -- circa 1995

I have had more than thirty years of experience in and with government to develop a sounder domestic and international political economy. My practical experience includes that of planner/economist working with the City of Chicago's designated planning firm (1967-70) to make that city a dominant international trade and financial center; the State of Illinois (1970-73) to help reform its tax, expenditure and economic development policies (particularly in the area of educational finance); and the Federal Government (1973-92) to better determine how the governmental regulatory apparatus (inclusive of taxes and subsidies) could be managed in a manner that would be socially efficient (including procedurally efficient and fair), as well as reasonably attain certain distributional goals of stability and fairness. I have written a book (1980) and more than a dozen articles (as well as contributions to government reports) on how these criteria could be met and it is now agreed that this work, for the first time, has shown a way to operationalize traditional welfare economics criteria. My own work has shown that it can also be operationalized in practical public policy, from the planning and management of the government telephone system to the management of global environmental and natural resources.

As a supervisor of people in the traditional government work environment, I was the operational "chief economist" of the Agency for International Development (a foreign service designated position) during 1983-85, responsible for the final approval for all non-project U. S. economic development assistance, the development of policy papers and guidances on economic development assistance, and research on new approaches to development assistance (e. g. privatization). My office, which coordinated A. I. D.'s "strategic assessment' capabilities involved supervision of up to 8 FTE professionals and 2 secretaries. In addition, I worked for 3 years as the Mission economist and private sector development officer, respectively, in both a state of near anarchy (Haiti) and in an autocracy (Morocco). I also participated as project leader in program design and evaluative efforts in several other countries (i. e. the effect of U. S. interventions on the Egyptian banking system), the